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Abstract 
The cooperative movement,  in recent times, appear to have started addressing the issue of corporate governance. 
Sequel to this development, some resources to promote good governance can reasonably be expected within the 
movement itself.  This paper therefore was set out to examine whether lack of transparency is a feature of most 
cooperative societies, to ascertain whether the executives of cooperative societies show good commitment 
towards accountability and to assess the significance of members’ participation in the democratic process giving 
room for the emergence of incompetent individuals on the executive and board of cooperatives in Nigeria. It was 
also meant to evaluate the need for cooperative societies to engage in sound internal control and risk 
management and to investigate whether weak corporate governance is solely responsible for the 
maladministration of cooperative societies in Nigeria. The source of data was primary and the five hypotheses 
formulated were tested using descriptive statistics and analysis of variance. Essentially, the study found that the 
executives of cooperative societies are not committed to transparency and accountability. The principal 
recommendations of the study are that the executives should demonstrate high level commitment towards the 
sustainability of cooperative societies and that these societies should embrace the principles of good corporate 
governance that is capable of fostering total accountability, adequate transparency, sound internal control and 
full disclosure of their activities. 
Keywords: Cooperative Societies, Corporate Governance, Accountability, Sustainability, Internal Control, 
Transparency and Disclosure     
 
1   Introduction 
The cooperative movement has been fueled globally by ideas of economic democracy which is a socioeconomic 
philosophy that suggests an expansion of decision-making power from a small minority of corporate 
shareholders to a larger majority of public stakeholders. Shaw (2006) opines that as occurred elsewhere in the 
developing world, co-operatives across Africa were introduced by the colonial powers and typically, ignored 
existing social and economic structures, many of which were based on informal co-operative organizations, 
especially at the village level. Characterized as a partnership of individuals, as opposed to partnership of capital, 
cooperatives rely on voluntary and free association of individuals, democratic management, economic 
participation of members, and autonomy and independence as the basic principles for their management. 
Therefore, contrary to what occurs in large private companies, cooperatives are managed by their members, who 
are the "business owners': in a one-individual-one-vote basis, independently from the amount of the cooperative 
capital. Moreover, there is not the pursuit of profits and cooperative targets are long-term ones, since the main 
focus is serving the needs of the cooperative owners (Brasilia, 2008). The last major study of the co-operative 
sector in Africa was published over ten years ago and emphasized that government intervention had tended to 
reduce member participation and had prevented rural co-operatives from becoming commercially viable. The 
report called for changes in the legal framework and for donor support for capacity-building measures such as 
member education, staff training and management systems (Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, & Brenneman,1993).  
 
Corporate governance on the other hand, had its origins in the 19th century arising in response to the separation 
of ownership and control following the formation of joint stock companies. The owners or shareholders of these 
companies, who were not involved in day-to-day operational issues, required assurances that those in control of 
the company, in particular the directors and managers, were safeguarding their investments and accurately 
reporting the financial outcome of their business activities. Thus, shareholders were the original focus of 
corporate governance. However, current thinking recognizes a company’s or a bank’s obligations to society, 
which includes all stakeholders.  Since the latter part of 2001, the already lively debate on corporate governance 
became a more focused topic due to big corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom and new laws like the 
Sarbanes – Oxley Act in the US were introduced to deal with such scandals in future.  
 
According to Bond (2009), these corporate failures have revealed instances in which directors have, in fact, 
violated the trust of members and shareholders (U.S. Congress, Senate Report 107-70, “Power’s Report”, 2003). 
Perhaps the most damaging misrepresentations by board members occur when the “duty of care” is not 
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exercised. The duty of care requires directors to act in good faith, apply their best judgment, and implicitly 
exercise due diligence. In the 2003 “Power’s Report”, Enron’s board was accused of carrying out its duties in a 
cursory manner and of failing to safeguard Enron shareholders (U.S. Congress, 2003). The recent rash of 
corporate scandals has diminished investor confidence in boards of directors that are responsible for monitoring 
executive performance and representing the interests of shareholders (Kim & Nofsinger, 2005).1 In the aftermath 
of these incidents, investors are looking with renewed interest for ways to improve the accountability and 
effectiveness of corporate boards (Rauterkus, 2003). This expectation is not limited to the companies or 
corporations but also to all institutions and embraces all stakeholders, be it banks, finance companies, 
cooperative banks and even corporative societies to mention just a few. 
 
1.1     Issues at Stake    
Despite the existence of a considerable literature on co-operatives, all too frequently they remain poorly 
understood institutions (Cuevas & Fischer, 2006). Co-operatives have succeeded in being both familiar and yet 
little understood for the general public and the academic world alike. There are many reasons for this. All too 
frequently the co-operative sector has been viewed through the prism of a specific enterprise, institutional form 
or a single country. Many studies have failed to capture the heterogeneous and diverse nature of co-operatives 
and downplayed their position as part of a sector with global reach and frequently operating as part of a global 
movement (Shaw, 2006). The main problems addressed in corporative governance are similar to those faced by 
the majority of organizations - where there is no one single owner who is also in charge of executive 
management. In large organizations, there are managers that are not owners, or there is a plurality of owners with 
ability to influence and different interests. Cooperatives also feature specific issues associated to their 
governance (Brasilia, 2008). 
 
Cuevas & Fischer (2006) identify the principal source of failure for Cooperative Financial Institutions (CFIs) as 
deriving from member/owner conflict with management. The growth of a cooperative inevitably expands (or 
dilutes) ownership and managers become subject to weaker controls. The development of managerial dominance 
within the cooperatives has been a strong theme within the literature on non –financial cooperatives as well. An 
influential model has linked cooperatives to a process of democratic degeneration. Meister (1984) identifies four 
stages in the internal transformation of democratic organizations into manager-led enterprises.This relates to the 
growth in size and complexity of the enterprise which enables management to take advantage of growing 
member apathy and distance from the original core cooperative values. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1.2     Objectives of the Study 
This study is carried out to achieve the following objectives 
(i) To examine whether lack of transparency is a feature of most cooperative in societies Nigeria 
(ii) To determine whether the executives of cooperative societies show good commitment towards 
accountability  
(iii) To assess the significance of members’ participation in the democratic process giving  room for the 
emergence of incompetent individuals on the executive and board of cooperatives in Nigeria 
 (iv)         To evaluate the need for cooperative societies in Nigeria to engage in sound internal control and                              
risk   management 
(v)          To investigate whether corporate governance is solely responsible for the maladministration of  
.         cooperative societies in Nigeria 
 
2     Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1      Conceptual Clarifications 
A cooperative is a business organization owned and operated by a group of individuals for their mutual benefit 
(O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). A cooperative is a business owned and controlled by the people who use its 
services. They finance and operate the business or service for their mutual benefit. By working together, they can 
reach an objective that would be unattainable if acting alone. The purpose of the cooperative is to provide greater 
benefits to the members such as increasing individual income or enhancing a member's way of living by 
providing important needed services. The cooperative, for instance, may be the vehicle to obtaining improved 
markets or providing sources of supplies or other services otherwise unavailable if members acted alone 
(Proceedings Report, 2007).The unique characteristic that differentiates co-operatives from other enterprise 
structures is its dual nature: they are business enterprises based on a membership- owned model. The associate 
aspect of a co-operative takes place to pursue the social goals of its members. As such, co-operatives form an 
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integral part of the private sector, pursuing successful commercial business practices based on the values of self-
help, self-responsibility, solidarity, and democracy. In relation to other enterprise structures, co-operatives are an 
alternate way of doing business but at equally profitable levels.(Proceedings Report, 2007)   
 
In Discussion Paper (2004), the vast amount of literature available on the subject ensures that there exist 
innumerable definitions of corporate governance. To get a fair view on this subject, it would be prudent to give a 
narrow as well as a broad definition of corporate governance.  In  a narrow sense, corporate governance involves 
a set of relationships amongst the company’s management, its board of directors, its shareholders, its auditors 
and other stakeholders. These relationships, which involve various rules and incentives, provide the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining these objectives as well as 
monitoring performance are determined. Thus, the key aspects of good corporate governance include 
transparency of corporate structures and operations; the accountability of managers and the boards to 
shareholders; and corporate responsibility towards stakeholders. In a broader sense, however, good corporate 
governance- the extent to which companies are run in an open and honest manner- is important for overall 
market confidence, the efficiency of capital allocation, the growth and development of countries’ industrial 
bases, and ultimately the nations’ overall wealth and welfare. It is important to note that in both the narrow as 
well as in the broad definitions, the concepts of disclosure and transparency occupy centre-stage. In the first 
instance, they create trust at the firm level among the suppliers of finance. In the second instance, they create 
overall confidence at the aggregate economy level. In both cases, they result in efficient allocation of capital. 
 
According to Claessens (2003), corporate governance would include the relationship between shareholders 
creditors and corporations; between financial markets, institutions and corporations; and between employees and 
corporations. Corporate governance would also encompass the issue of corporate social responsibility, including 
such aspects as the dealings of the firm with respect to culture and the environment. One detailed definition of 
the concept is that used by the OECD, which is available on their website. The corporate governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives 
are set, and means of attaining those  objectives  and monitoring performance. Put simply therefore, corporate 
governance concerns all the institutional structures that help to maximize efficiency, ie, legislation, company 
organizations, agreements, etc. A division is often made between internal and external control, as, for example, 
between legislative and capital market control. The organization of corporate governance is more widely 
concerned with ownership structures as a company's success is affected by the type of ownership structure and 
owners it has. (Pellervo, 2000)   
 
The issues of corporate governance continue to attract considerable national and international attention.  
Corporate governance is about effective, transparent and accountable governance of affairs of an institution by 
its management including the board conduct.  Governance of financial institutions should aim at protecting the 
interests of all stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, creditors, regulators, depositors and the public. Corporate 
governance is particularly important in countries where a number of financial failures, frauds and questionable 
business practices have adversely affected investor confidence.  Investors as well as depositors want safety of 
their investments, deposits and funds, which need to be ensured by the management of a company, bank or 
financial organization entrusted with soliciting investments or deposits.   In short, corporate governance is really 
about process, in particular, a decision-making process that (a) hold individuals accountable, (b) encourage 
stakeholder participation, (c) facilitate the flow of information, and (d) rely on open and clear rules that are fairly 
and uniformly enforced.  It is not the policies and decisions themselves, but how polices and decisions are 
implemented. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2.2   Literature Review 
Specific studies into corporate governance issues as they impact on co-operatives in the developing world are 
very few and this, of course, presents considerable difficulty in reaching any definitive conclusions. However 
there are some clear starting points for an analysis of the key issues which can be derived from existing studies 
of the co-operative sector in general, several useful case studies, and discussions with co-operative leaders 
from the developing world. Given the nature of the evidence, and the general characteristics of co-operatives in 
the  developing world, a region by region approach has been adopted (Shaw, 2006). According to Brasilia 
(2008), the use of good practices of governance has proved to be fundamental in the success and perenniality 
of organizations, mainly in what regards security and returns to members. In congruence with this line of 
thought and with the increasing recognition that corporate governance is a critical element for sustainable 
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economic growth, a working meeting was organized in London in   on February 8, 2007.  The participant met 
with an agenda; to build consensus on the corporate governance priorities and technical assistance needs of co-
operatives in developing countries.  
 
Brasilia (2008) also observes that every type of organization, not limited to private companies, may benefit 
from advancements in the field of governance. Indeed, international organizations have taken the lead in 
disseminating governance practices in organizations such as pension funds, state-owned companies, and 
cooperatives. As in the majority of contemporary organizations, these also exhibit a set of owners or financers 
and a set of managers - either owners or otherwise. Accommodating the interests involved, streamlining 
differences between expectations of groups of owners and guiding and monitoring the managers are the main 
concerns of governance in organizations. A well-developed system of governance yields more transparent 
relations, reducing several risks and improving security in all organizations of the system. Brasilia (2008) 
further contends that with the severance between business ownership and management, issues of governance 
start arising, involving alignment of interest of the parties, motivation, asymmetry of information and risk 
propensity. The main function of corporative governance practices is to ensure that executives pursue the goals 
determined either by owners or by those responsible for strategic decisions, and not their own goals. In order 
to avoid these problems - described in the literature as agency problems, individuals in charge of preparing and 
conducting strategic issues shall monitor the behaviour of those who carry out, exemplified by a Board of 
Administration, monitoring the management and requiring transparency in information and accountability.  
Pallervo (2000) notes that in deciding upon the composition of the board, the members of a cooperative should 
pay particular attention as to who is appointed chairperson. The qualities of a good chairperson should- include 
enjoying the widespread confidence of the owners and the necessary respect both within and outside the board. 
The board and particularly its chairperson, should have the know-how and experience that gives authority vis-à-
vis the chief executive. Although members of the board are expected to have a reasonable ability to interpret 
statistical information relating to the company, they are not expected to be concerned with its day-to-day 
operations. On the other hand, the board should have the resources to use outside experts when necessary. The 
attributes of board members can be listed as follows: 
 
(i)     Foresight and extensive knowledge 
(ii)    Criticality, independent judgement and autonomy 
(iii)  Cooperative 
(iv)   Diligence and time-effective 
(v)    Specialized know-how in some part area. 
 
The result of a research carried out by Leuven University in Belgium further reveals the renaissance being 
experienced by the co-operative movement in Africa, as displayed in the table below. In addition, the 
development from the Peer-Review Workshop, held on February 2007, in London, is very significant both for 
the opportunity that it presents to strengthen corporate governance but also because it demonstrates that co-
operatives are natural partners in the fight against poverty.(Proceedings Reports, 2007) 
 
 Analysis of Number of Co-operatives and  Co-operative Members  
                                                       Number of Co-operatives  Co-operative Members  
Country                                                                  1990                                       2005       1990  2005  
Ghana          1,000         2,850  Not Available  Not Available  
Kenya          4,000         7,000  2.5 million  3.3 million  
Nigeria        29,000       50,000  2.6 million  4.3 million  
Senegal          2,000         6,000  Not Available  Not Available  
Source: Leuven University, Belgium 
 
Malo & Vezina (2004)  propose  a model of five management and governance roles within co-operatives. They 
also link the tendency for the diminishing role of membership in governance to the expansion of the cooperatives 
and a growing domination of commercial values fostered by a professional management distanced from 
cooperative values. Spear (2004) identifies this problem as prevalent within larger co-operatives in the United 
Kingdom. He argues that the co-operative systems of governance contribute to the development of powerful and 
entrenched managers who have more control than in similar private-sector companies. He attributes this to 
managers greater degree of insulation from pressure from external stakeholders together with weaker signals 
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from external markets. Internally, pressure on managers is also weak  because of low levels of member 
participation as evidenced by the situation in UK Consumer Co-operative.  
 
Chaves & Sajardo-Moreno (2004) on the other hand argue that the empirical evidence for the hypothesis of a 
tendency towards increasing management control is mixed. In their own study, they emphasize the importance of 
the selection and training of managers in tune with core social enterprise values. This process could be aided by 
the development of appropriate training courses and educational institutions together with a code of conduct. 
These processes are critical to the survival of the democratic enterprise. Spear (2004) also suggests a series of 
measures to limit managerial power by enhancing the commitment to and involvement in the running of the 
cooperative by the wider membership. Particular issues for co-operative boards derive from their elected status 
which provides no certainty that the director will hold the right skills mix and knowledge to effectively scrutinize 
management decisions. This situation is worsened by low levels of member participation in the democratic 
processes and the extent to which the board of the cooperative societies are perceived to be transparent as a result 
of executive and management dominance which often trails these institutions (Shaw, 2006).   
 
 
Transparency and Accountability: According to Bhasin (2009), one of the major pillar of good corporate 
governance is ‘transparency’ which incorporates a system of checks and balances between key players-board of 
directors, senior level of management, auditors and other stakeholders.  Steger & Amman (2008) observe that 
every organization has a governance system which concerns the distribution of power and responsibilities and 
consequently, accountability for its performance. Alo (2008) observes that the rise in interest in the subject of 
corporate governance could be traced to the fact that there is now an increasingly clear separation of ownership 
from management. The disconnection between the ownership of a business and its management which shields 
the management from the day to day activities of the business has created the need for the installation of an 
appropriate and effective framework for insuring transparency and accountability in the management of 
businesses.  
  
Internal Controls: Sulaiman (2003) observes that the role of internal controls is to ensure that appropriate 
financial, operational and compliance controls are in place. It is the board’s responsibility to report on the 
effectiveness of these controls. Lack of internal controls often causes fraudulent activities to go unchecked and 
inevitably result in the downfall of the organization. The internal control function, which is invariably linked to 
the risk management function, is associated with the internal audit division in most organizations.   
 
Disclosure of  Information: According to Healy and Palepu (2001), disclosure comprises all forms of voluntary 
corporate communications, for example, management forecasts, analyst’ presentations, the annual general 
meetings, press releases, information placed on corporate websites and other corporate reports, such as, stand-
alone environmental or social reports. Appropriate corporate governance disclosure systems means that a good 
company is able to impress the markets with its integrity. Bhasin & Manama (2009) note that it is universally 
accepted that all material issues relating to corporate governance of the enterprise should be disclosed in a timely 
fashion; the disclosure should be clear, concise, precise and governed by the “substance over form” principle. 
 
2.3      Theoretical Framework 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory was embedded in the management discipline in 1970 and gradually developed by Freeman 
(1984) incorporating accountability to a broad range of stakeholders. Wheeler, Colbert & Freeman  (2003) argue 
that stakeholders theory was derived from a combination of the sociological and organisational discipline 
.Indeed, stakeholders theory is less of a formal unified theory and more of a broad research tradition, 
incorporating philosophy , ethics ,political theory, economics, law and organisational science. Stakeholder theory 
can be defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives”. Unlike agency theory in which the managers are working and serving for the stakeholders, 
stakeholder theorists suggest that managers in organisations have a network of relationships to serve – these 
include the suppliers, employees and business partners. It was argued that this group of network is important 
other than owner-manager-employee relationship as in agency theory (Freeman, 1999).On the other end, 
Sundaram & Inkpen(2004) contend that stakeholders theory attempts to address the group of stakeholders 
deserving and requiring management’s attention.  
Whilst, Donaldson & Preston (1995) claim that all groups participate in a business to obtain benefits, Clarkson 
(1995) suggests that the firm is a system, where there are stakeholders and the purpose of the organisation is to 
create wealth for its stakeholders. Freeman (1984) contends that the network of relationship with many groups 
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can affect decision making processes as stakeholders theory is concerned with the nature of these relationships in 
terms of both processes and outcomes for the firm and its stakeholders. Donaldson & Preston (1995) argue that 
this theory focuses on managerial decisions making and interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value and no 
sets of interest is assumed to dominate the others. This theory is therefore relevant to the system of cooperative 
societies which are supposedly financial organizations, owned and controlled by the members, for the provision 
of small scale financial services. Every member of the society is a stakeholder and is expected to participate in 
the running of the cooperative with a view to ensuring its survival. 
                 
3     Methodology 
The data used for this study were basically primary in nature. A sample size of 60 respondents were taken from 4 
Cooperative Societies from tertiary institutions in Oyo, South West geo-political zone of Nigeria. Questionnaire 
were administered to 15 members of each of these 4 societies in the tertiary institutions which were Ajayi 
Crowther University, Federal School of Survey, Emmanuel Alayande College of Education and Federal College 
of Education (Special). The members were stratified into academic staff and non-academic staff. Because there 
are always more of non-academic staff in tertiary institutions and usually much more in cooperative societies of 
such institutions, 5 academic staff and 10 non-academic staff were selected randomly. Out of the 60 sampled 
respondents, only 44 duly filled and returned the instrument The study also made use of 5 point Likert scale 
ranging from Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Hardly Agree =3 Disagree = 2 to Strongly Disagree = 1    
 
Five hypotheses were formulated for the study and these were: 
(i)  Lack of transparency is not a feature of most cooperative societies in Nigeria 
(ii) Executives of cooperative societies do not show good commitment toward accountability  
(iii)Most members do not participate  in the democratic process giving room for the emergence of incompetent 
individuals on the executive and board of cooperatives in Nigeria 
(iv)Cooperative societies in Nigeria do not engage in sound internal controls and effective risk  management 
(v) Poor corporate governance does not solely account for the maladministration of cooperative societies in 
Nigeria 
 
4     Data Presentation and Analysis 
                                                                  Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 1: Lack of transparency is not a feature of most cooperative societies in Nigeria  
Response X  F Fx X S % 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Hardly Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree         
5                                                                
4                                                   
3         
2                 
1 
5
6
 6 
       14 
        14 
25
24
18 
28 
14 
 
 
2.42 
 
 
1.8404 
11.11 
13.33 
13.33 
31.11 
31.12 
 
Using a 5 point Likert scale, Table 1 depicts a simple descriptive statistics  with a mean  score   of  2.42   and a 
standard deviation of 1.8404  .This indicates that majority of the respondents do not agree with the view that lack 
of transparency is not a feature of most cooperative societies in Nigeria.  
 
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics 
           N       Mean Standard 
deviation 
Percentage 
Lack of transparency is not a feature of most 
cooperative financing in Nigeria 
  
          
         45 
         
       2.42 
 
   
 1.8404     
 
    62.23    
 
Thus with a mean score 2.42 from a maximum point of 5 (i.e. below the midpoint of 5) using the Likert scale, 
and a cumulative percentage of about 62.23% (higher than the average percentage of 50%), the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Hence, lack of transparency is a feature of most cooperative societies in Nigeria                                   
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Hypothesis 2 
 
Table3: Executives of cooperative societies do not show good commitment towards accountability  
Response X F          Fx        X         S           % 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Hardly Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree         
5                                                                
4                   
3          
2             
1 
12
17 
  8 
  4 
  4 
60
         68 
         24  
 8 
 4 
                        
 
3.64 
 
 
    1.5071 
       26.67 
     37.78 
      17.77 
       8.89 
      8.89 
 
Using a 5 point Likert scale, Table 3 depicts a simple descriptive statistics with a mean score of 3.64 and a 
standard deviation of 1.5071.This indicates that majority of the respondents agree with the view that executives 
of cooperative societies do not show good commitment  towards accountability. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics                                                                                             
           N       Mean Standard 
deviation 
Percentage 
Executives of cooperative societies  do not 
show good commitment towards 
accountability  
 
          
         45 
                 
3.64 
 
1.5071 
     
    64.45 
 
Thus with a mean score of 3.64 from a maximum point of 5 (i.e. above the midpoint of 2.50) using the Likert 
scale, and a cumulative percentage of about 64.45 % (higher than the average percentage of 50%), the null 
hypothesis is accepted. Hence, the executives of cooperative societies do not show good commitment towards 
accountability.   
 
Hypothesis 3 
Table 5: Most members do not  participate in the democratic process giving room for the emergence of 
incompetent individuals on the executive and board of cooperatives in Nigeria 
                                                                            
                                                                           ANOVA 
 
     
Source of Variation Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F        Sig. 
Between Groups 1.389 4 .347 .639 .637 
Within Groups 21.722 40 .543   
Total 23.111 44    
 
From the result, it is shown that the sum of squares for between groups and within group are 1.389 and 21.722 
respectively. The mean square shows a value of 0.347 and 0.543 respectively. However the F-statistic values 
which helps to tell about the overall significant of a model and its goodness of fit shows a value of 0.639. This 
result is below the tabulated value of 2.61 with V1=V2 degree of freedom. The result from the significance table 
shows it is not highly significant. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis that most members do not  participate in 
the democratic process giving room for the emergence of incompetent individuals on the executive and board of 
cooperatives in Nigeria 
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Hypothesis 4 
 Table 6: Cooperative societies in Nigeria do not engage in sound internal controls and risk management                                
                                                                           ANOVA 
 
     
Source of variation Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.177 4 .794 .388 .816 
Within Groups 81.801 40 2.045   
Total 84.978 44    
 
From the result, it is shown that the sum of squares for between groups and within group are 3.177 and 81.801 
respectively. The mean square shows a value of 0.794 and 2.045 respectively. However the F-statistic values 
which helps to tell about the overall significant of a model and its goodness of fit shows a value of 0.388. This 
result is below the tabulated value of 2.61 with V1=V2 degree of freedom. The result from the significance table 
shows it is not highly significant. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis that the cooperative societies in Nigeria 
do not engage in sound internal controls and risk management.  
                                                                        Hypothesis 5 
 
Table 7:Poor corporate governance does not solely account for the maladministration of cooperative societies in 
Nigeria                          
                                                                          ANOVA   
 
     
Source of Variation Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.058 4 .515 .390 .814 
Within Groups 52.742 40 1.319   
Total 54.800 44    
 
From the result, it is shown that the sum of squares for between groups and within group are 2.058 and 52.742 
respectively. The mean square shows a value of 0.515and 1.319 respectively. However the F-statistic values 
which helps to tell about the overall significance of a model and its goodness of fit shows a value of 0.390. This 
result is below the tabulated value of 2.61 with V1=V2 degree of freedom. The result from the significance table 
shows it is not highly significant. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis that poor corporate governance does not 
solely account for the maladministration of cooperative financing in Nigeria   
 
Empirical Findings 
From the five hypotheses tested above the following observations were revealed and these are: 
-  Lack of transparency is a feature of cooperative financing in Nigeria 
 
- The executives of cooperative societies do not show good commitment towards accountability  
 
-  Most members do not participate in the democratic process giving room for the emergence of incompetent 
individuals on the executive and board of cooperatives in Nigeria 
 
- Cooperative societies in Nigeria do not engage in sound internal controls and risk      management  
 
-  Poor corporate governance does not solely account for the maladministration of cooperative  societies in 
Nigeria 
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5    Conclusion and Recommendation  
The study was carried out to investigate the role of corporate governance practices in corporative financing in 
Nigeria.  Three of the most  important corporate governance mechanisms such as transparency, accountability, 
internal controls and risk management were  examined. The survey was meant to examine whether lack of 
transparency is a feature of cooperative financing in Nigeria, to determine whether the executives of cooperative 
societies show good commitment      toward accountability and to assess the significance of members’ 
participation in the democratic process giving room for the emergence of incompetent individuals on the 
executive and board of cooperatives. It was also designed to evaluate the need for cooperative societies in 
Nigeria to engage in sound internal controls and risk management and also to investigate whether poor corporate 
governance is solely accountable for the maladministration of cooperative societies in Nigeria. Five hypotheses 
were stated in their null form and were also tested using descriptive statistics and analysis of variance. The 
outcome of the hypothesis testing was that while only hypothesis 1 was rejected, hypothesis 2, 3, 4 and 5 were 
accepted. Essentially, the study revealed that poor corporate governance does not solely account for the 
maladministration of cooperative societies in Nigeria. The study therefore  make the following recommendations 
that will enable cooperative societies in Nigeria to run their affairs as smoothly as possible and also engender 
trust and confidence in the cooperative system.  
(i) That the members must be deeply interested in the activities of the cooperative societies and be ready to 
serve in various capacities whenever the situation arises.  
(ii) That the executive should demonstrate a high level of commitment towards the sustainability of 
cooperative societies 
(iii) That these societies should embrace the principles of good corporate governance that is capable of 
fostering total accountability, adequate transparency, sound internal controls and full disclosure of 
their activities. 
(iv) That the Ministry of Trade and Cooperatives or the relevant ministry as the case may be, should 
endeavour to beam its searchlight on the administration and operation of cooperative societies in 
each of the states in Nigeria.  
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